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Over the past two decades married women’s labor force participation has
shown a considerableincrease in the US. In particular, both the cross sectional
and the life cycle behavior of married women’s hours worked has undergone
a substantial change. I show that a key factor underlying this trend is the
change in behavior for married women with children. In particular, while in
the past married women of childbearing age used to specialize in childrearing
and homeproduction activities at theexpense ofengaging in market work, they
now do not curb their labor participation.
What gives riseto this change in behavior? In this paper I focus on relative
changes in returns to experience as an explanation. In particular, I quanti-
tatively assess the contribution of changes in the return to experience to the
change in married women’s life-cycle pro…les of hours worked. I build a life-
cycle model with human capital accumulation and home production in which
the basic unit of analysis are married couples with children, and calibrate it
using data from the 1970s and 1990s. I show that changes in returns to experi-
ence can account for a large part of observed changes. I also demonstrate that
decreases in the gender wage gap cannot account for much of the change in the
shape of life cycle pro…les for women.
¤I thank Richard Rogerson for his encouragement, support and continuing guidance.
11 Introduction
An important trend in the American society in the last decades has been a con-
siderable increase in married women’s labor force participation. In particular, the
disaggregation of the data by age shows that both the cross sectional and the life
cycle pro…les of married women’s hours worked have changed. Although in the sev-
enties the pro…le had the typical ”two-peaked” shape, it changed in the nineties to
a ”one-peak” shape, which is characteristic of men and single women life cycle be-
havior. This fact suggest that a key factor underlying this trend is the change in
behavior for married women with children. In particular, while in the past married
women of childbearing age used to specialize in childrearing and homeproduction ac-
tivities at the expense of engaging in market work, they now do not curb their labor
participation.
This paper documents these facts and focuses on relative changes in returns to
experience as an explanation. Returns to experience have been rising within educa-
tion groups both for men and women since the seventies. Prior studies (Blau & Kahn
(1997), O’Neill & Polachek (1993)) have shown that women’s increased actual expe-
rience and the relative increase in the return to experience can explain one third to
a half of the decline in the gender wage di¤erential. Moreover, these studies provide
evidence that returns to experience increased relatively more for women than for men
over the past decades.
The goal of this work is to provide further evidence to this …ndings and quanti-
tatively assess the contribution of changes in the return to experience to the change
in married women’s life-cycle pro…les of hours worked. For this purpose, I build a
life-cycle model with human capital accumulation and home production in which the
basic unit of analysis are married couples with children. Parents allocate their time
between market, home and leisure activities. Childcare is produced through a combi-
nationof parental time and market goods andservices. Humancapital is accumulated
in the form of learning-by-doing. As a consequence, wage pro…les are determined en-
dogenously. The law ofmotion for humancapital is assumedtobe identical for agents
of di¤erent gender1.
In the analysis I will focus on how relative changes in the return to experience
a¤ectlifecyclepro…les ofearnings and hours worked. Thebasic strategyis tocalibrate
the model using data from the seventies, and then ask how the model’s predictions
change when we allow for changes in the return to experience and the gender wage
gap to their nineties values. The simulation results show that changes in returns to
experience can account for a large part of observed changes. Moreover, I also show
that decreases in the gender wage gap cannot account for much of the change in the
shape of women’s life cycle pro…les.
1Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1997) estimate a human capital production function with on-
the-job training. They do not …nd evidence that the shape of the production function di¤ers by
gender
2Section 2 documents the facts. In Section 3 we provide evidence of the relative
increase inreturns toexperiencefor women. Wepresent the life cycle model in Section
4. Section 5 provides a discussion of the functional forms and the parameters used
in the simulations. The results obtained for two sets of experiments are described
in Section 6. Section 7 presents the general equilibrium version of the model and
discusses the results obtained. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in
Section 8.
2 Facts
Married women’s labor force participation increased substantially over the past two
decades2. The extent of the increase in labor force participation is even more striking
when we disaggregate the data by age. Table 1 summarizes percentage changes in
labor force participation by age, gender and marital status based on Census data
for 1970 and 19903. Labor force participation of married women increased by 96%
and 70% for the age groups 25 to 35 and 35 to 45 respectively. These are the age
groups where the fertility decisions are taken. The group of married mothers with
childrenofpreschool age is characterized by thebiggest increaseinparticipation rates.
For married mothers with children of preschool age in the same two age groups the
increase is even bigger, the average number of hours worked per person more than
double. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that for given age groups, labor
force participation rates for single women and married men remained constant or
slightly decreased between the two decades. Big decreases in participation at older
ages shows the e¤ects of early retirement. These facts still hold true when we further
disaggregate the data and we study the labor force participation of married mothers
by number of children of preschool age. Moreover, disaggregating by education we
still observe this increase. In fact, the education group that experiences the largest
increase is married women and married mothers with a high school degree.
Table 1: Percentage change in average hours worked per person by age 1970 vs.
1990.
women 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
married, spouse present 96 70 49 18 9
married, spouse present kids<6 134 117 53 29 78
single 3 9 –0.2 -23 -40
men
married, spouse present -0.12 -0.4 -1 -18 -33
2For an extensive description of this phenomen see Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997), Olsen
(1994), Goldin (xxx).
3Census data are taken from McGrattan and Rogerson (1998).
3In order to better understand the extent of this increase we consider the age
pro…les of weekly hours worked per person from the Census data4. In the seventies
the age pro…les for hours worked were convex (two-peaked) for marriedwomen. Labor
attachment was weaker during the childbearing age range. This is the typical shape
of the women’s pro…le as pointed out in the seminal work on women’s earning and
labor force participation by Mincer (1962, 1974) and Mincer and Polachek (1974).
As is shown in Figure 1 in the nineties the negative relationship seems to disappear.
In fact, the 1990 pro…le has the concave (one-peaked) shape which is typical for
men. Moreover, the average number of hours worked for married women increased
for every age group.5 The information channeled by the data on the average hours
of work per person includes information on changes on both the extensive and the
intensive margin. In particular, the same life cycle behavior for the two decades can
be observed when we look at data on the number of hours worked per worker (the
intensive margin) and on the labor force participation rates disaggregated by age (the
extensive margin).
The comparison of hours pro…les for di¤erent demographic groups gives a clearer
picture of the extent of this change in married women’s behavior. Figure 2 (a and b)
compare Census data in1970 and 1990 for married men and women, married mothers
and single women. Married women and married mothers shows a di¤erent behavior
in terms of pro…les relative to men and single women. The latter groups displayed
the characteristic single-peaked shape for their hours pro…les in 1970. In the nineties
married women’s pro…les have the same shape as men’s and single women’s pro…les.
Moreover, the average hours worked do also increase. Marital status seems to
play a much smaller role in the labor decision. This provides evidence of what we can
de…ne as convergence of married women’s pro…les to married men’s and single women
pro…les in terms of their shape. At the same time, as it is shown in Figure 3, the
average hours worked per person for married women and married mothers converged
to average hours for men and single women since the 1950s (Census data).
The second type of convergence is also documented by comparing annual hours
worked in the seventies to annual hours worked in the nineties. Table 2 summarizes
these results for the age range 30 to 45. Annual hours worked increased 13% over the
period. The increase is up to 34% for married women whereas for married men the
increase was only by 9%. This show evidence of a shift in participation from married
men to women in the past twenty years.
4The same behavior is shown when we look at average hours worked per worker. Moreover, as it
is shown in McGrattan and Rogerson (1998) the same change in behavior can be observed when we
look at life cycle pro…les.
5The same age pro…le are displayed for married mothers with children of preschool age.
4Table 2: Time allocation: annual hours by gender and marital status
total men wom. mar. wom. mar. men single wom. single men
n1995
n1975 1.13 1.12 1.24 1.34 1.09 1.11 1.15
Data Source: CPS, Annual Demographic Files 1976 and 1996. Entries assume annual
hours worked in 1975 equal to one.
To summarize in the past twenty years two forms of convergence seems to have
happened for what concerns married women’s labor force participation. The shape of
married women’s pro…les is now similar to the shape of men and single women pro…le.
That is, women do not curb their participation when they get married and over the
fertile ages. Moreover, average hours worked for married women is also closer to the
average hours worked by men.
A nice interpretation of these facts is that less women childbearing age in were
participating to the labor market or that women in the same age range who were
already working were curbing their hours of work on the market, during the seventies.
This phenomenon is farless sointhe nineties. In particular, wecouldthink that inthe
nineties married women moved from home production activities to market activities.
3 Why? The proposed “culprit”
The possible explanations for this behavior that have been proposed in the literature
deal with changes in observed characteristics such as women’s schooling and work
experience, changes in fertility, family dissolution, and a general decline of the gender
wage gap. In this work we identify the culprit in the change in relative returns to
experience. As documented in di¤erent studies (Katz and Murphy (1992)) over this
two decades returns to experience increased for every gender/education/experience
combination. The following papers provide detailed evidence about the relationship
between earnings and work characteristics for men and women. The focus of all these
works is to document which factor contributed more to the decline of the gender wage
gap since the seventies. Blau & Kahn (1997), and O’Neill & Polachek (1993) show
that both the increase in return to experience and the increase in actual experience
for married women contributed to explain a large portion of the decreasing gender
wage di¤erential (see also Regalia & Rios-Rull (1999)). In particular, it is shown that
convergence in work related characteristics (schooling and experience) may account
for one third to a half of the drop in the gender gap, whereas the relative increase in
women’s returns to experience explains part ofthe rest6. Blau & Kahn (1997) provide
estimates of female and male earning equations for 1979 and 1988 using PSID data.
Their results showthat, althoughbothfemale and male returnto experienceincreased
6Among the factors that are mentioned as a possible cause of this behavior are for instance,
de-unionization, occupational shift and the decrease in blue collar wages.
5over the time period, women’s return to full time experience increased more than
men’s. Figure 4 (a and b) provides evidence of these facts. We plot the marginal
return to experience function7with coe¢cients set accordingly to Blau and Kahn’s
estimates for a regression where only “supply” variables referring to human capital
are introduced as explanatory variables.
O’Neill and Polachek (1993) use PSID data for the period 1976 to 1987 to investi-
gate the main factors which contributing to the one percent yearly decrease in gender
wage gap experienced in the US since 19768. By running a regression for actual ex-
perience interacted with a time trend they are able to disentangle the contribution of
changes in actual experience from the contribution of changes in return to experience
to the decrease in the gender wage gap. Their estimates show that the average annual
change in return to experience over this time interval has been positive both for men
and women. This means that returns increased for both groups. Furthermore, the
increase was faster for women. In fact, the average change in return for women of
all experience level was more than twice as much the average change for men. For
younger workers (i.e. workers with less years of experience), the relative increase in
women’s return to experience is even bigger. Young women working on the market
faced an average increase in returns to experience four times bigger than the increase
for men. These …ndings are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Percentage increase in wages due to 20 years of experience
Actual Experience
All levels 1-15 Years
Female 1.8% 1.6%
Male 0.8% 0.4%
The entries in the table are based on estimation results that appears in O’Neill and
Polachek (1993) Table 8
The entries in the tableareobtainedby manipulating the estimatedaverageannual
change in the return to actual years of experience that are presented by O’Neill and
Polachek (1993)(Table xx intheir paper). Giventheir estimates of the averageannual
change in the return to experience for the period 1976-1987, we compute the average
7Blau and Kahn regression is given by
lnwt = ®0 + ®1 exp+®2 exp2 +¯X + "
where X is a vector of explanatory variable which include race and education. They consider both
full time and part time experience.
8To be noticed both studies use PSID data. This is due to the fact that starting in 1976 data on
actual number of years of work experience were collected. In fact, due to women’s segmented labor
force participation, potential experience does not provide an accurate measure of the actual number
of years worked.
6percentage increase in the wage that would be experienced by a worker with twenty
years of actual experience.
To summarize, the result obtained by Blau and Kahn (1997) and by O’Neill and
Polachek (1993) provide evidence of the twofollowing facts 1) the returnto experience
increasedover the time periodfor both menandwomen; 2) this increase was relatively
larger for women. We now move to a description of the model and to a discussion of
the main …ndings that we obtain.
4 The Model
We build a life-cycle model with human capital accumulation and home production
where the basic unit of analysis are married couples with children. Parents allo-
cate their time between market, home and leisure activities and human capital is
accumulated in the form of learning-by-doing9. As a consequence, wage pro…les are
determined endogenously. Furthermore, childcare is produced through a combination
of parental time and markets goods and services. Thus, the parents’ time allocation
decision is key to the analysis. Individuals have perfect foresight about the length
of their lifetime. We assume price taking behavior. Individuals take as given the
rental rate of human capital, that di¤ers by gender, and the real interest rate. The
earning pro…les are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Past working decision
a¤ect earnings at later ages. In what follows we describe the model in details and we
de…ne the equilibrium of the model.
4.0.1 Demographics
The basic unit of analysis is a married couple. Fertility is exogenous. A couple is
assumed to have two children (one male, one female) in the second period of its life.
Individuals live for four periods, where we would consider one period in the model
as corresponding to ten years. We do not explicitly model the …rst two (ten years)
periods of agents’ life when they are children living with their parents. They become
adults in the third period of their life as a married couple. Every couple “retire” at
the end of period four.
According to this framework the adult lifespan is forty years long. We would refer
to adults as to individuals in the age range 20 to 60. Hence, the …rst adulthood period
corresponds to the age range 20-29, the second period (i.e. the parenthood period)
corresponds to age 30 to 39 and so forth. Kids leave their parents household at age
20 and become adult as a married couple. Agents “retire” when they are 60.
9Shaw (1989) and Imai (1999) estimate life-cycle models with human capital accumulation. In
the parametrization of the model, we will rely on the estimates of the human capital production
function from Imai’s work.
74.0.2 Preferences
We assume that each couple has preferences over joint consumption, husband’s and




t¡1(U (ct;`mt;`ft) + V (xt))
where ct represents family consumption, `mt is husband’s leisure, `ft is wife’s leisure,
xt represents child’s “quality” and ¯ (0 < ¯ < 1) is a discount factor.
4.0.3 Childcare production:
Child quality is produced using a combination of motherly and fatherly time and
services purchased on the market. As we will see, a key element is the degree of
substitutability between parental timeandmarketservices. More formally we assume:
xt = Xt (hft;hmt;st) t = 2;3 (1)
where hmt is the fatherly time spent in childcare, hft represents motherly time spent
in childcare and st is the input of market goods and services. As we mentioned above,
the production of childcare takes place only during the second and third period of a
married couple’s life. We allow for the function X to di¤er at time t = 2 and t = 3
since we assume that as the child grows older the amount of parental time needed in
the production of the child’s quality decreases.
4.0.4 Human Capital accumulation
We assume that agents accumulate human capital via a process of learning-by doing.
In particular, human capital next period depends on the amount of human capital
accumulated up to the current period and on the number of hours worked in the
market in the current period. That is,
µgt+1 = Gg(µgt;ngt) 8t; g 2 fm;fg (2)
where ngt is hours of market work at time t and µgt is the amount of human capital
owned by an agent of gender g at time t: The human capital production function may
di¤er for male and female. A married couple is indexed by its initial stock of human
capital (µm0;µf0) 2 R2
+; where µg0; g 2 fm;fg; is the initial stock of human capital
of the partner of gender g.
84.0.5 Equilibrium
Given prices ¼g and r and the initial stock ofhuman capital (µm0;µf0) 2 R2
+ a married
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µgt¼gngt + (1+ R)at ¡ (ct + st) 8t; a0 = aN+1 = 0
ngt +`gt + hgt = 1 g 2 ff;mg; xt = hgt = st = 0 for t 6= f1;2g
where ¼g is the e¢ciency wage of a worker of gender g whereas R is the rental rate
of capital. We assume that married couples begin their life with no assets and that
they consume everything they have during the last period of their life (no bequest).
5 Functional Forms and Parametrization
In this section we describe the functional form and the value of the parameters used
in the simulation. The basic strategy is to calibrate the model using data from the
seventies, and then ask how the model’s prediction change when we allow for changes
in the return to experience and the gender wage gap to their nineties values. In
particular, for the baseline economy, we set the relative return to experience and
the gender wage di¤erential to their seventies value and we choose the remaining
parameters following the standard evidence. When no empirical evidence is available
we set parameter values in order to match hours and earnings pro…les for both men
and women in the seventies. In the second step returns to experience and the gender
wage gap are set to their nineties values. We study the model’s prediction in terms
of earnings and hours worked age pro…les in order to assess the contribution of those




As is standard in the literature on labor supply, I assume that preferences are sepa-
rable in consumption and leisure and also across time. In particular, I assume period
utility functions of the form:










V (xct) = lnxt (5)
where A > 0 and ®g > 1; g 2 ff;mg. ¾g = 1
®g¡1 is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for hours worked. As mentioned above xt represents child’s quality.
5.1.2 Childcare production
There seems to be no standard choices to rely on for this relationship. Since there is
no evidence on the shape of this function, and the degree of substitutability between
maternal time and market produced goods and services seems to play an important
role, a natural choice seems to assume a constant elasticity of substitution childcare











1¡½ is the elasticity of substitution between maternal time and market goods
and services (such as day care)in the production of childcare. We alsoassume di¤erent
weights for maternal time and market goods and services which can be allowed to
change over time as the children grow older.
5.1.3 Law of motion for human capital
I choose the functional form for human capital that was estimated in Imai (1999)
for prime-age men. Obviously, this will facilitate the process of assigning parameter
10We can easily consider a more general childcare production function that include also fatherly
time. Although we would need to assume some form of substitutability between motherly and

















1¡¾ is the elasticity of substitution between motherly and fatherly time. Assuming that only
maternal time enters the production of childcare is consistent with the fact that genetically women
must provide more of their time to their children. check lit.
10values11. Speci…cally, I assume the following functional form:
µgt+1 = µgt (1¡ ±g)+ ´gtµgtn
Ã
gt (7)
According to this speci…cation human capital is accumulated through learning-by-
doing, that is the actual level of human capital is an increasing function of the level of
humancapital and ofthe number of hours workedinthe previous period12. Moreover,
humancapital depreciates at a constant rate ±g: Returns to experience arerepresented
by the …rst derivative of this function, and are proportional to ´gtÃ: ´gt is allowed to
be a function of age.
5.2 Parametrization
5.2.1 Preferences
In the micro literature the estimates for the elasticity of substitution for men range
between 0.1 and 0.4513. Although there is consensus about the fact that the female
elasticity of substitution is bigger for women than for men there is a wide variety
of estimates for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for women14. We set the
elasticity to be consistent with the set of estimates, obtained by conditioning on
fertility, reported in Smith and Ward (1985). This seems to be a sensible range of
values since fertility is exogenous in the model15. In the experiments that we describe
in the next section we set ®g = 3:22 for both men and women (which is equivalent to
¾ = 0:45). This assumption is made in order to have men and women as similar as
possible in terms of parameters and functional forms characterizing their behavior.
In our benchmark economy we will set ®m = 3:5 (which is equivalent to ¾m = 0:4)
and ®f = 3 (which is equivalent to ¾f = 0:5). The disutility of labor parameter A is
set such that the model produces a realistic level of labor supply. We set A = 2:5 so
that prime age workers in typical simulations work 40% of their time. We also assume
the discount rate ¯ = 1
1+R where R = (1+ r)
10 is the compounded real interest rate.
11Shaw (1989) estimates a similar life cycle model. She considers the law of motion for human
capital to be quadratic in both hours worked and human capital stock plus a cross product term. On
the other hand, the choice of a Cobb-Douglas technology is standard in the labor supply literature
(Ben-Porath, Heckman..) although usually human capital accumulation is modeled in the form of
on-the-job training.
12Using NLSY data the author documents the existence of this signi…cant complentarity between
current wages and current hours worked in terms of learning-by-doing.
13For men we refer to Altonjj (1986) and to Pencavel (1986).
14See Mroz (1987) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986).
15Smith and Ward (1985) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution both conditioning
on fertility (i.e. by assuming the fertility rate to be constant) and not conditioning on fertility. In
the latter case they do not exclude the indirect e¤ects on fertility of an increase in wages. They
obtain a value of 0.43, which is in the male range, for the conditioned elasticity. Moreover, Smith
(1977) obtains a value of 0.56 using a di¤erent set of data. Intertemporal elasticity is much larger
(1.632) when they do not condition on fertility.
11That is, we assume the rate of time preferences to be equal to the compounded real
interest rate over the (10 years) time period. This is consistent with the data when
we control for changes in family size over the life cycle16.
5.2.2 Childcare production
To my knowledge there is no evidence about a correct range of values for the pa-
rameter representing the elasticity of substitution between maternal time and market
produced goods and services. In the following we set ½ = 0:7: This value is chosen
in order to match the hours and earning age pro…les for both men and women in the
seventies. Hotz andMiller (1988) provide evidence about the two following facts. The
childcare intensity in mother’s time decline as the children ages, at = ±
t¡1a; whereas
the childcare intensity in market services, bt, is constant over time17. In the model we
incorporate their …ndings by assuming a1 = 0:55 and a2 = 0:5: On the other hand,
the parameter representing the weight given to market services is set equal to 0:5
for both periods. That is, as the children grow older a relatively bigger amount of
market goods and services (i.e. college tuition and fees, etc.) are needed relatively to
parental time.
5.2.3 Law of motion for human capital
In the simulations we will assume that men and women are characterized by the same
law of motion for human capital. As in Imai (1999) the function ´gt includes a pure
age e¤ect. This means that as an individual ages, proportionally less human capital
can be accumulated. The following function is considered in Imai’s work:
´gt = ´g0 ¡ (t¡ 20)´1
where t=20, 21, 22.... represents age, and where NLSY yearly data from 1979 to
199318are used to structurally estimate a life-cycle model with human capital accu-
mulation of a form very similar to the one speci…ed in this work. Speci…cally, I will
use the following values for the parameters of the human capital production function:
16As in Attanasio (1999) and Attanasio and Browning (1992).
17The assumption that ± 6= 0 cannot be rejected. ± is signi…cantly di¤erent from 1.
18The data sample include individuals 20 to 35 years of age. Imai restricts his attention to interior
solutions. In fact, only 10% of the individuals in his sample worked zero hours.
12Table 4: Estimates for µgt (1¡ ±)+
¡









The entries in the table are taken from Imai (1999) Table 4. We consider the estimates
for high school graduates.
Since the estimates are obtained using yearly data, I rescale them to their 10 years
period equivalent. Given that for each (10 years) period the number of hours worked
is constant, this is simply done by iterating the yearly law of motion over the ten
years period. As previously mentioned the model is estimated for prime-age men in
Imai (1999). Therefore, we need to make assumptions about women’s behavior. In
particular, we restrict the parameters to be equal for men and women except for ´g0:
In our …rst experiment we will set ´f0 for women to be 0.13 in the seventies. This
corresponds to a 7% male-female di¤erential in returns to experience. In the nineties
female returns to experience are set to be equal to male returns.
6 Results
In this section we describe the simulation results obtained for two particular exper-
iments. We discuss the performance of the model by comparing the age pro…les for
hours worked and hourly wage predicted by the model withactual age pro…les in 1975
and 1995. Figure 5 show the actual age pro…les for weekly average hours worked and
hourly wages for married men and women19. We can notice the same patterns we
discussed in Section2. In particular, for married women the cross sectional hours age
pro…le is U-shaped in the seventies, whereas it displays the typical concave shape in
the nineties. Moreover, women are characterized by a ‡at age earning pro…le in the
1975 which again becomes concave in the 1995. Married women in 1995 exhibit a
cross-sectional behavior that is similar to men’s typical behavior. In what follows we
compare the actual pro…les to the ones predicted by the model in order to assess its
performance.
We use the set of preferences and technology parameters described in the previous
section for both experiments. Moreover, we assume that married couple are endowed
with one unit of human capital and no assets at the beginning of their life. In the
simulation we set the real interest rate to 4% annually. The compounded interest over
the ten years period is therefore equal to 1.48. We assume the discount rate ¯ =
1
1+R
where R = (1 + r)
10 is the compounded real interest rate. For what concerns the
19The …gure is based on CPS, annual demographic …le data for 1976 and 1996.
13rental rates for human capital we choose parameters values such as the femal to male
ratio equal the gender wage di¤erential in the 70s. We set this number to be 0.669
as in O’Neill (1985). This number represents the gender wage gap for white workers
adjusted for di¤erences in hours worked20.
The values chosen for the parameters are summarized in Table 5.














As described inthe previous section, weparametrize the humancapital production
function as in Imai. Moreover, the male-female di¤erential in returns to experience
is assumed to be 7% in the seventies. In the nineties female returns to experience are
set to be equal to male returns. Table 6 summarizes the parameter chosen for the
human capital production function.










f0 = ´0 0.1389
Figure 6 show the hours and earning pro…les obtained from the experiment. A
comparison of Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows that the model can reproduce the drop
in women’s hours worked per person in the seventies although hours do not increase
again as the children grow older. The increase in ´f0, all the other parameters being
the same, produces a concave pro…le for married women’s hours worked. Since we
are assuming interior solutions, the pro…les can be interpreted as the average hours
worked (or years worked) over the time period. Also, married women earning pro…les
are much ‡atter in the seventies than in the nineties when, indeed, they are similar to
men’s pro…les. Married men’s behavior does not change much between the seventies
and the nineties as a consequence of the change in women’s behavior (men’s are
otherwise the same). Their pro…les closely resemble those observed in the data. To
be noticed, in the simulation we only set the parameters in the model to match the
seventies pro…les as given by the data. Hence, the fact that a change in the return to
20The gender wage ratio is adjusted by multiplying unadjusted earning ratioby race and sex-
speci…c ratios (male-to-female) of average hours worked per week by workers on full-time schedule
(non-agricultural).
14experience generates the nineties wage and hours pro…les for women is particularly
interesting. These results are fully consistent with the structure of the model. In
fact, in the model as women’s return to experience becomes relatively higher, the
opportunity cost of a segmented labor force participation is also higher. In fact,
since human capital depreciates, curbing the hours worked on the market in favor of
childrearing and home production activities will highly reduce women’s current and
future earnings. Moreover, we increase the female to male wage ratio to its nineties
value. The change does only generate an increase in levels of participation, women
work more hours on average, but it does not contribute to the change in the shape of
the age pro…le.
In the second experiment we set the parameter ´g0 to match the male-female
di¤erential inreturns to experienceas estimatedbyBlau andKahn(1997)respectively
for 1979 and 1989. According to their estimates the ratio
´m0
´f0 is equal to 1.45 in 1979
and to 1.05 in 89. Hence, although men were characterized by returns to experience
45% larger than women in 1979, the di¤erential dropped to 5% in the late eighties.
Table 7 summarizes the parameter values chosen for the human capital production
function.












Figure 7 showthehours andearningpro…lesobtainedfromthe experiment. Again,
the comparison of the predicted pro…les with the actual ones is encouraging. In par-
ticular, in this case we improve upon the …rst experiment for what concerns married
women’s hours and earning pro…les. In fact, average hours worked increase as the
childrenleave their parents’ household(as observedin thedata). Moreover, the pro…le
for hours worked in the seventies is more similar to the one observed in the data.
Based on these simulation results we run a regression similar to the one run by
Blau and Kahn21 and we compare the marginal return to experience we obtain to the
one they estimate in the data. Although this is not meant to be a de…nite assessment,
themodel prediction goes inthe right direction. The model produces estimates for the
21In order to do this we set the yearly hours endowment to 5000 and we consider 2000 as the
number of hours worked by a full time worker. Therefore, the following normalization ¹ n5000
2000 10,
where ¹ n is the number of hours worked during the time period, provide information about the
number of years (out of the 10 available) worked full time by the agents.
15log wage regression that imply marginal return functions similar to the ones obtained
by using Blau and Kahn’s estimates.
Therefore, at least to a …rst approximation, we can conclude that the model and
the explanation chosen are a good approximation of the reality. In particular, the
shape of the seventies and the nineties pro…les can be reproduced by the model based
only on the change in the return to experience.
7 The General Equilibrium version of the model
We now consider the general equilibrium version of this model. The OLG version of
the model provides a plausibility check in terms of the equilibrium prices behavior.
In fact, the general equilibrium e¤ect is not very big and equilibrium rental rates are
not unrealistic for the parameter values chosen. In particular, we make the following
assumptions. There is no bequest. Parents consume all their assets in the …nal
period of their life. We assume no population growth. In every period the oldest
couple “retire” and it is replaced by the oldest children that become adults. There is
a Uniform distribution of agents for every age group that is time invariant. Moreover,
the rental rate of human capital for men and women and the real interest rate are
determinedendogenously in equilibrium as the result ofa …rm’s maximizing behavior.
We assume that labor of di¤erent ages is homogeneous. Aggregate labor is the sum
of e¢ciency units of work. Male and female labor are heterogeneous.
In what follows we add the assumptions made about the production side to the
life cycle model described in the previous section and we de…ne the equilibrium of the
model. We will restrict our attention to the steady state equilibrium, i.e. we assume
factor prices to be constant over time.
7.0.4 Technology
Output is produced by using e¢ciency units of female and male labor and capital as
inputs. There is a constant return to scale production technology given by:
y = F (Hm;Hf;K)
where Hm and Hf represents aggregate e¢ciency units of labor for men and female.
Each period the physical capital depreciates. We denote the rate of capital deprecia-
tion by ±k.
Once the technology is de…ned we can formulate the recursive versionof the model
and provide the equilibrium de…nition. In this economy the agents individual state
variable is given by zt = (at;µmt;µft). Given that we set the value function in the
terminal period equal to zero, the optimal decision rules c(zt); s(zt); ngt(zt); hgt (zt)
g 2 ff;mg will solve the dynamic programming problem:
16Wt(z) = max(U (ct;`mt;`ft) + V (xt))+ ¯Wt+1(z0)
subject to the period constraints.
We can now move to the description of the equilibrium for this economy. I focus
on an equilibrium concept where factor prices, aggregate capital and aggregate labor
are constant over time.
7.1 Equilibrium
Astationary equilibrium is alistoffunctions fc(zt);s(zt);nmt(zt);hmt (zt);nft (zt);hft(zt)g,
¼m;¼f;r;K;Nm;Nf and initial condition z = z0 such that:
1) optimization.
c(zt);s(zt);nmt(zt);hmt(zt);nft(zt);hft(zt) are optimal decision rules;
2) competitive inputs markets.
¼m = F1(Hm;Hf;K)
¼f = F2(Hm;Hf;K)
r = F3(Hm;Hf;K) ¡ ±k
3) market clearing
PN
t=0¹tµg(zt)ng(zt) = Hg g 2 fm;fg PN
t=0¹ta(zt) = K PN
t=0¹t (c(zt) + s(zt)) = F (Hm;Hf;K) ¡ ±kK
A brief discussion of the equilibrium follows. The …rst condition simply describes
the optimal decision rules. Taking prices and initial condition as given, agents solve
their decision problem. The second condition requires rental rates of capital and of
labor to be equal to their marginal product. Market clearing conditions require that
1) the aggregate labor input in e¢ciency units equals the labor inputs summed over
the population; 2) assets holdings are su¢cient to keep total capital constant over
time; 3) aggregate consumption must be equal to total output minus the amount of
capital that depreciates. Moreover, we are considering only interior solutions. The
number of hours worked in each ten-years period can be interpreted as the average
amount of time that is worked by a male or female individual (or alternatively, as the
average number of years of work experience).
17The functional forms chosen for the production function and its parametrization
are discussed below. Obviously, the strategy followed here is the same as for the
life-cycle model.
Output is producedaccording to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
y = ©K°(ÁmNm +ÁfNf)1¡° (8)
We assume complementaries between male and female labor. In the absence of ev-
idence about this issue this speci…cation provide a reasonable starting point. We
choose Ág such that
Áf
Ám equal the gender wage di¤erential in the 70s. We set this
number to be 0.669 as in O’Neill (1985). This number represents the gender wage
gap for white workers adjusted for di¤erences in hours worked22. Moreover, we set
the labor share ° to 0:36 as it is typical in the Real Business Cycle literature. The
depreciation rate is set to 10% yearly which is equivalent to a period depreciation
±k = 2:59: The parameter © is a scale parameters and is set to 10:
We run simulation for the same set of parameters discussed in the previous section
though, in this case, we will also consider a case where the period discount rate is
set equal to 0:6. This value is equivalent to a yearly discount rate that is bigger
than one or to a negative rate of time preferences23. Although a negative value may
seem surprising it is consistent with the results found in consumption studies. This
may re‡ect the fact that preferences for consumption grow systematically over some
periods of the life cycle (for instance as the family size increases). For the general
equilibriummodel, negativerates oftimepreferences giveraise tomore realisticsteady
state values for the real interest rate.
7.2 Results
In this section we describe the simulation results obtained for the OLG model for
the same two experiments we conducted for the life cycle model. We use the set of
preferences parameters described in the previous section for both experiments. For






±k 2.59 (10% yearly)
22The gender wage ratio is adjusted by multiplying unadjusted earning ratioby race and sex-
speci…c ratios (male-to-female) of average hours worked per week by workers on full-time schedule
(non-agricultural).
23This issue is discussed in Hotz, Kydland and Sedlachek (1988). Moreover, negative rate of time
preferences are also assumed in Rios-Rull (). A negative value is also assumed in Auerbach and
Kotliko¤ ().
18Moreover, the (10 year) period discount factor is set to ¯ = 0:47744754which
corresponds to an annual rate of ¯ = 0:994 which is commonly used in the literature.
As described in the previous section, in the …rst experiment we set the male-female
di¤erential in returns to experience to 7% in the seventies. In the nineties female
return to experience is set to be equal to male returns. The results obtained in
terms of hours and earning pro…les resemble those produced by the life cycle model
as described in Figure 6. For the second experiment we also obtain hours and wages
pro…les that are similar to the ones produced by the partial equilibrium model (as
in Figure 7). Moreover, for both experiments the general equilibrium version of the
model does also generate estimates for the log wage regression that imply marginal
return functions similar to the ones obtained by using Blau and Kahn’s estimates.
Therefore, the introduction of a general equilibrium e¤ect allows us to check for the
realismofthe pricebehavior while keeping the basicproperties ofthe model unaltered.
A few general comments on the results we obtain for the equilibrium rental rates
apply. First, given the value chosen for the discount factor, in both experiments the
steady state equilibrium real interest rate is around 7% in the seventies and it is of the
order of 8% in the nineties. In order to obtain more realistic values for the real rate of
return to capital we run the same experiment setting the period discount factor beta
to 0.6 (this values corresponds to a negative yearly rate of time preferences). This
allows us to generate an equilibrium interest rate around 5% which is more realistic.
Second, in general, as we move from the economy that represents the seventies to
the economy that represents the nineties the real interest rate increases whereas the
e¢ciency wage for both gender decreases. That is, the capital/labor ratio is smaller
in the nineties. In conclusion, at least to a …rst approximation, we can claim that the
model and the explanation chosen provide a good approximation of the reality. In
particular, the shape of the seventies and the nineties pro…les can be reproduced by
the model based only on the change in the return to experience.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the contribution of changes in return to experience to the
change inthe aggregate and life cycle behavior of married women onthe labor market.
A life-cycle model with human capital accumulation and home production in which
the basic unit of analysis are married couples with children reproduces the evidence
for hours worked and wages pro…les both for men and women. In particular, the
higher increase in women’s returns to experience relative to men in a model which is
otherwise unchanged can predict the female and male hours worked age pro…les both
for the seventies and for the nineties.
Further exploration of this relationship necessarily requires the estimation of the
human capital production function both for men and women and over the two time
periods of interest. The estimation will also be used to provide evidence on the
19relative changes in the return to experience over the two decades.
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25igure 5: Hours and Earning pro…les: CPS, Annual Demographic (March) Files.
1975 vs 1995



















































26Figure 6: Hours and Earning pro…les: Experiment II























































27Figure 7: Hours and Earning pro…les: Experiment II
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